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Notes
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND DEMAND NOTES
The question propounded for consideration in this article em-
braces primarily the application of the statute of limitations to
the various types of negotiable instruments payable on demand.
Although a superficial examination of the language employed in
such statutes creates an impression that the problem can be cate-
gorically solved in every instance, a more detailed investigation
reveals that in few fields of the law is there greater vacillation
and obscurity.
Concerning the time at which the statute of limitations begins
to run, it is an elementary principle universally adhered to that
the statute is not set in operation until the cause of action has
been perfected.' Although this rule is regarded as fundamental
in all jurisdictions, the chief difficulty is encountered in deter-
mining when a cause of action has accrued. It is this latter troub-
lesome problem that has caused American and English courts to
become quagmired in confusion when applying the statute to
negotiable demand obligations. Realizing that the statute cannot
be set in operation until all conditions precedent to the accrual of
a cause of action have been fulfilled, the courts have strained logic
and reason to the breaking-point in their endeavors to justify a
conclusion that although such notes are expressly proclaimed to
be payable "on demand," yet an actual demand is not necessary in
order to perfect a cause of action. This construction has resulted
in such shallow law that the courts have been forced to pyramid
exceptions in order to harmonize jurisprudence, to some degree,
with existing business and commercial conditions.
IWilliston, Contracts, sec. 2040; 1 Wood, Limitations, sec. 118; Minne-
haha County v. Boyce (1912) 30 S. D. 226, 138 N. W. 287.
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I. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND
ORDINARY DEMAND NOTES
A. The General Rule
The great weight of authority, with but few cases announcing
the contrary doctrine, is to the effect that with regard to ordi-
nary promissory notes payable on demand the statute of limita-
tions begins to run in favor of the maker as against the payee
from the date of the note.2 This rule necessarily includes another
rule, namely, that a demand by the holder is not essential to the
perfecting of the cause of action on the note.3 The modern situa-
tion in England is represented by the widely cited case of Nor-
ton v. Ellman.4 In that case the note sued upon was in the fol-
lowing form: "I promise to pay 400 on demand with lawful
interest." Plaintiff made a demand thereon within six years
after the date of the note, but h9 did not institute proceedings
thereon until after six years from the date of the note. The ques-
tion presented to the appellate court was whether the statute
began to run from the date of the note or from the date of the
demand. In holding that the plaintiff was barred by the statute
the court said, "A promissory note payable on demand is a pres-
ent debt, and is payable without any demand, and the statute
begins to run from its date-a demand prior to the bringing of
the suit is unnecessary."5
The general rule was established very early in Missouri and
has remained undisturbed to the present time. In the case of
Easton v. McAllister,6 the Missouri Supreme Court in a short
opinion decided that as regards the instant problem the statute
must be construed to mean that "whenever the debt is in a situa-
tion to be sued upon," thenceforward the statute runs. With this
as a major premise the court then completed a syllogism by add-
ing, "Now on a demand note, suit can be brought as soon as it is
made. Hence it follows that the statute runs on such a note from
its date."? Though in the opinion of the writer, the court begged
2 For supporting citations in addition to those to be subsequently noted
see 44 A. L. R. 397.
3 The parentage of both these rules is generally attributed to several
early English cases. (See 2 Ames, Bills and Notes, p. 61) The earliest of
these cases is Capps v. Lancaster (1597) Cro. Eliz. 548, 78 Eng. Rep. 794,
in which it was held that an actual demand was not a condition precedent
to the bringing of an action on a demand note and that the suit itself was
sufficient demand. This case was followed by Rumball v. Ball (1711) 10
Mod. 38, 88 Eng. Rep. 616, holding that a demand note "was a debt in
praesenti and even if a demand was necessary the action itself was suffi-
cient demand." A year later the case of Collins v. Denning (1712) 3 Salk.
227, 91 Eng. Rep. 792, announced a similar ruling.
4 (1837) 2 M. & W. 461, 150 Eng. Rep. 839.
GIbid. Accord, Hartland v. Jukes (1863) 158 Eng. Rep. 1052.
6 (1826) 1 Mo. 662.
7 Ibid.
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the question in its second contention, the fact remains that the
principle announced has been sustained and concurred in by an
unbroken line of Missouri decisions.8
While most of the jurisdictions follow the majority rule as
stated," in one jurisdiction the issue is in doubt and in another
a modification of the rule prevails. In an early South Carolina
case10 the courts of that jurisdiction followed the general rule,
holding that since "the holder can bring suit on the same day
that the note is made * * * * a cause of action has accrued to him,
and from that time the statute of limitations begins to run.""
Despite this clear statement the same court some forty years
later involved itself in a direct contradiction in the case of Nash
v. Woodward.12 The Supreme Court held that the right of action
on a demand note did not accrue until there was a demand, and
therefore the statute did not begin to run until that time. In
reaching this result the court relied on the rule announced in the
earlier South Carolina case of Smith v. Steen. 3 However, an
examination of that decision reveals that the instrument sued
upon was a certificate of deposit and not an ordinary promissory
demand note. As will appear later, cases involving certificates
8 Jameson v. Jameson (1880) 72 Mo. 640; Boyd v. Buchanan (1914)
176 Mo. App. 56, 162 S. W. 1075; St. Charles Savings Bank v. Thompson
(1920) 284 Mo. 72, 223 S. W. 734.
Ala: First National Bank of Union Springs v. Blue (1924) 20 Ala. App.
107, 101 So. 75. Ark.: McCollum v. Neimeyer (1920) 142 Ark. 471, 219
S. W. 746. Cal.: O'Neil v. Magner (1889) 81 Cal. 631, 22 Pac. 876; Bell v.
Sackett (1869) 38 Cal. 407; Vermilyea v. Vermilyea (1923) 61 Cal. App.
608, 215 Pac. 686. Ill.: Knecht v. Boshold (1908) 138 Ill. App. 430. Ky.:
Hodges' Adm'r v. Asher (1928) 220 Ky. 431, 6 S. W. (2d) 451. La.: Darby
v. Darby (1908) 120 La. 847, 45 So. 747. Md.: Blick v. Collins (1917) 131
Md. 625, 102 Atl. 1022. Mass.: Fletcher v. Sturtveant (1920) 235 Mass.
249, 126 N. E. 428. Miss.: Spiro v. Shapleigh Hardware Co. (1925) 141
Miss. 38, 106 So. 209. N. J.: DeRaismes v. DeRaismes (1903) 70 N. J. L.
15, 56 At]. 170. N. Y.: McMullen v. Rafferty (1882) 189 N. Y. 456; Wen-
man v. Mohawk Ins. Co. (1835) 13 Wend. 267; Howland v. Edmonds (1862)
24 N. Y. 307; Wheeler v. Warner (1872) 47 N. Y. 519; Knapp v. Greene
(1894) 79 Hun. 264, 29 N. Y. Supp. 350; Loewer's Gamrinus Brewery Co. v.
Precker et al. (1921) 185 N. Y. Supp. 829; Cottle v. Marine Bank (1901)
166 N. Y. 53, 59 N. E. 736; Mills v. Davis (1889) 113 N. Y. 243, 21 N. E.
68; In Re Nellis' Will (1926) 214 N. Y. Supp. 378; In Re Van Vranken's
Estate (1923) 198 N. Y. Supp. 445; In Sewell v. Swift (1912) 136 N. Y.
Supp. 371, the court said that "section 410 of the Code of Civil procedure
provides that where a right exists but a demand is necessary to entitle a
person to maintain an action, the time within which the action must be
commenced must be computed from the time when the right to make a
demand is complete." Therefore the court held that the statute began to
run from the date of the notes.
10 Smith v. Blythewood (1839) Rice (S. C.) 245, 33 Am. Dec. 111.
11 Ibid.
12 (1902) 62 S. C. 363, 16 S. E. 1003.
13 Smith v. Steen (1908) 138 Ill. App. 430.
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of deposit form an exception to the general rule. Hence it would
seem that the Nash case is based upon authority not in point.
As has been previously noted, wherever the general rule is
recognized, it is also held that a demand before suit is not neces-
sary. Indiana, however, has gone a step farther, and in the
widely cited case of Kraft v. Thomas"4 has considered the prob-
lem from an alternative viewpoint. After deciding that the note
sued upon was a demand promissory note and as such embraced
within the general rule, the court said, "But conceding that a de-
mand was a condition precedent to the right to sue, still we think
the right of action is barred for the reason that the demand
must be made within the statutory period. If the rule were other-
wise, a party, by his own act or failure to act, could preclude the
running of the statute until such time as might suit his interest,
convenience or pleasure to put it in motion."'5 It is the conten-
tion of the writer that to be consistent on this point, it must be
held either that a demand is not necessary and the statute begins
to run at once, or that a demand is essential and the statute does
not begin to run until the demand is made. In connection with
this case, it might be noted that the alternative portion of the
decision has been refuted by Section 70 of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law which, codifying the general rule, provides, "present-
ment for payment is not necessary in order to charge the person
primarily liable on the instrument."
The courts have seemingly advanced four different reasons for
the general rule. One has already been mentioned, namely that a
demand promissory note represents a debt in praesenti and hence
a cause of action exists against which the statute of limitations
can run.1 6 New York has rationalized the general rule by hold-
ing that "the word 'demand' is not to be treated as a part of the
contract, but is used to show that the debt is due."' 7 The Su-
preme Court of Kentucky has said, "The reason for the rule is
that as payment can be 'easily' demanded, an actual demand is
not necessary to complete the cause of action, but the commence-
ment of the suit is a sufficient demand.""8 Still another basis is
to be found in the doctrine of the Illinois court that "the duty to
make a demand upon the holder and pay his note rested upon the
maker." 9 To apply this rule of non-negotiable paper to negoti-
able instruments is absurd as the writer will attempt to illustrate
subsequently.
14 (1889) 123 Ind. 513, 24 N. E. 346.
15 Ibid., 123 Ind., 1. c. 515.
16 See Norton v. Ellman, supra note 4.
17MeCullen v. Rafferty, supra note 9.
lsHodges' Adm'r v. Asher, supra note 9.
19 Hunt v. Divine (1865) 37 I1. 137.
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B. The Effect of Particular Provisions
In the application of the majority rule it is frequently neces-
sary for the courts to determine, as a preliminary step, whether
the instrument under consideration is payable on demand or not.
To do this it often becomes necessary for the courts to pass upon
the effect of particular expressions used in the instrument.
The expression "on demand, after date" does not alter the na-
ture of an ordinary demand note.2 0 The theory back of this con-
clusion is based on the idea that "the words, 'on demand, after
date' are more nearly analogous to such an expression as 'with
interest after date'; if a promissory note, payable on demand,
with inter-after date, is paid the next day after it is given, one
day's interest is due and payable. In the case at bar, the inten-
tion of the parties was apparently that it should be payable im-
mediately, and no intention appears on the face of the note that
the parties intended to stipulate for at least on day's time before
a demand should be given. '21 A similar result has been reached,
when the promise is to pay "at any time within six years from
date"22 or "when kald for."23
A rather dubious and strained decision was reached by the
New York court in Knapp v. Greene.24 It was held that the words
"on demand, after three months notice," immediately preceding
the promise to pay, did not so qualify the note as to take it out
of the general rule. It was the theory of the court that the pro-
vision for notice was for the benefit of the debtor and not for
that of the creditor, the court holding that the words merely
limited the right of the creditor to sue presently.
An interesting example of judicial construction is afforded by
thi case of Harris v. Townsend2 5 in which the note in suit was
dated March 14, 1904 and stated that "on demand or at my death
I or my estate promise to pay the sum of $292, with interest, etc."
The maker of this note lived for more than six years after the
execution of this note, and suit was filed against his adminis-
trator, who pleaded the statute. The upper court was of the
opinion that while it was true that the holder could sue on the
note at any time he desired, it was also true that he had a right
to wait until the death of the maker to do so. Hence the court
concluded that the statute did not begin to run until that event
occurred.
Frequently an ordinary promissory demand note calls for the
20 Fenno v. Gay (1888) 146 Mass. 118, 15 N. E. 87; O'Neil v. Magner 81
Cal. 631, 22 Pac. 876.
21 Hitchings v. Edmonds (1882) 132 Mass. 338.
22 Young v. Weston (1855) 39 Me. 492.
23 Kraft v. Thomas, supra note 14.
24 (1894) 79 Hun. 264, 29 N. Y. Supp. 350.
25 (1912) 101 Miss. 590, 58 So. 529.
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payment of interest and the question then arises as to whether
such a provision takes the note out of the general rule. Numer-
ically, the weight of authority in this country and in England
favors the view that a provision for interest does not prevent the
statute from running from the date of the note.28 However there
is well reasoned authority for the contrary position.27 The basis
for the latter view has been thus expressed, "It can hardly be
supposed that this money was hired with the expectation on the
part of anyone concerned that the payment of the note was to be
immediately demanded or made, or, indeed, within any short
period. We think, on the contrary, that the note, given for a loan,
was intended to be a continuing security, an investment of a more
or less permanent value."' 28
C. The Intention Rule
Many courts have lessened the severity of the general rule by
applying the so-called "intention rule" in some cases. The Indi-
ana court has thus stated the principle, "Although the general
rule is that the statute begins to run at once on a promissory
demand note, yet, where a speedy demand, or notice to pay, would
manifestly violate the intent and purpose of the contract, or
where delay in making demand was contemplated by the contract,
actual demand is necessary to mature the note, and the statute
does not run until that time." 29 This rule is now a generally
recognized exception to the general rule.2 0
The manner in which the "intention rule" has been applied is
illustrated by two interesting cases. In a Missouri case31 the note
read, "one day after date I promise to pay to E. J. the sum of
$600 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum .... The cofidi-
tion of the above obligation is such, that if the above E. J. shall
demand any or all of the above during her natural life, it shall
be due and payable according to the tenor of the above; but in
case of her death before any or all of the above shall be liqui-
dated, it shall remain with me and my heirs forever, as my por-
26Norton v. Ellman, supra note 4; Wheeler v. Warner (1872) 47 N. Y.
519; McMullen v. Rafferty, supra note 9; In Re Van Vranken, supra note
9; In Re Doremus (1919) 215 Ill. App. 164; DeRaismes v. DeRaismes, supra
note 9.
27 Spiro V. Shapleigh Hardware Co., supra note 9; Yates v. Goodwin(1901) 96 Me. 90, 51 Atl. 804; Baxter v. Beckwith (1913) 25 Colo. App.
322, 137 Pac. 901; Boyd v. Buchanan, supra note 8.
28 Yates v. Goodwin, supra note 27.
29 Daugherty v. Wheeler (1890) 125 Ind. 421, 25 N. E. 543.
30 See: Wenman v. Mohawk (1835) 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 268; Blick v.
Collins, supra note 9; New England Fire Ins. Co. v. Haynes (1898) 71
Vt. 306, 45 AtI. 221; Baxter v. Beckwith, supra note 27; Boyd v. Buchanan,
supra note 8; Hartland v. Jukes, supra note 5; Vermilyea v. Vermilyea,
supra note 9; Sullivan v Ellis (1915) 219 Fed. 69.4.
31 Jameson v. Jameson, supra note 8.
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tion of her estate." The court held that the payment was un-
equivocally conditioned upon demand being made at any time
during the life of the payee, and if made within that time the
sum was to be paid, and if not so made, it was not to be paid
at all, but to be forever retained by the payor. The court con-
cluded, "Here the parties contemplated a delay in making a de-
mand, and the limit to the delay was the lifetime of the payee.
And therefore the statute does not bar the action." In the Mary-
land case of Blick v. Collins32 it was held that the terms of the
following note indicated that the parties intended it to represent
a continuing liability which should mature only upon actual de-
mand of payment, or upon the failure to provide further col-
lateral if required: "Dec. 9, 1907. On demand for value received,
I promise to pay to J. C., or order, $2250 with interest, having
deposited with said J. C. as collateral security for the payment of
this note certain shares of stock, with 6uch additional security as
may from time to time be required by said J. C., and which said
additional security I promise to give at any time demanded. If
these additional collateral be not so given when demanded, then
this note shall be due; and rebate of interest taken shall be al-
lowed on payment prior to maturity."
D. Rule With Regard to Indorsers
As the courts have unanimously agreed on the general rule
with regard to makers of demand notes, so also have they agreed
on the view that a contrary rule should be adopted with refer-
ence to indorsers of demand notes. It has never been doubted
that the statute of limitations should not begin to run against an
indorser's liability on a promissory demand note until the holder
has made an actual demand. In reaching this result the courts
have relied upon the peculiar nature of the indorser's contract.
The leading case on the point is Parker v. Stroud= in which
an action was brought against the representatives of the estate
of an endorser of a demand note. The note was dated November
23, 1870, and payment was demanded and refused at the bank in
February, 1880; due notice of nonpayment was given the in-
dorser. The action was begun in March, 1881, and the defendants
plea of the statute of limitations was sustained. In reversing the
lower court, the New York Court of Appeals quoted from and
followed the equally famous case of Merrit v. Todd 4 holding that
"A promissory note payable on demand, with interest, is a con-
tinuing security, and an indorser remains liable until an actual
demand; and the holder is not chargeable with neglect for omit-
ting to make such demand within any particular time. Therefore,
2 Supra note 9.
33 (1885) 98 N. Y. 379.3' Merritt v. Todd (1861) 23 N. Y. 28.
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as against indorsers, the statute does not begin to run until after
an actual demand is made." In differentiating between the rule
generally applied to makers of demand obligations and the rule
then announced with reference to indorsers, the court in sub-
stance held that the plain import of the indorser's contract is that
the maker of the note will pay the same at a certain time and
place; and if it remains unpaid after demand is made at such
time and place, he will pay it upon notice of its nonpayment. On
the other hand, the theory behind the general rule applied to
makers of such paper is of a different tenor since such parties are
under a general obligation to pay the debt. In other words, the
former's contract is conditional, while the latter's is absolute.
II. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND BANK NOTES
The extreme dogmatism of the general rule, with its frequent
thwarting of the intentions of the parties, and the fundamental
difference between promissory demand notes and bank notes,
have combined to establish an exception to the general rule with
regard to bank notes-the statute does not begin to run until
demand and refusal.
The earliest recognition of the individual attributes of bank
notes, and the first statement of the theory upon which this ex-
ception is based, was in an opinion by Lord Mansfield35 in which
he said, "These notes are not like bills of exchange, mere securi-
ties or documents for debts, nor are they so esteemed, but are
treated as money in the ordinary course and transaction of busi-
ness, by the general consent of mankind."
The earliest recognition of the exception in the United States
was in a case in 18533r which supported the exception by holding
that bank notes serve the purposes of money. Two years later a
Tennessee case ' expounded this theory more fully, holding that
"bank notes differ essentially from promissory notes. They are
not evidences of debt or security for money, strictly speaking,
but are treated as money: they are transferable by delivery, and
are issued and put in circulation with intention that they shall
pass hand to hand and circulate as money, and with the further
intention that they shall continue in circulation as money during
the continuance of the banking corporation; or, at least, that they
shall be returned as seldom as possible; and that when returned,
they shall again be reissued, and thus remain in circulation in-
definitely. Hence the statute does not begin to run until a de-
mand is made and the bank refuses to pay."
A second theory on which this exception is based is illustrated
by the case of Butts v. Vicksburg Ry. Co. 8 in which the court
35 Miller v. Race (1758) 1 Burr. 457, 97 Eng. Rep. 398.
36 Dougherty v. Western Bank of Ga. (1853) 13 Ga. 287.
37 F. & M. Bank of Memphis v. White (1855) 2 Sneed (Tenn.) 482.
38 (1886) 63 Miss. 462.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol20/iss4/11
NOTES
said, "The general rule is that the statute does not apply to bank
bills because their date is no evidence of the time they were is-
sued, as they are continuously being returned and reissued by the
banks.,,3,
However, when such bills have ceased to circulate as money
and have ceased to be taken in and reissued by the banks, they no
longer have that distinctive character which excepts them from
the operation of the statute. Hnce the rule is that when this
occurs, the statute runs from the time the bank note loses its
singular nature.40 In Tennessee this rule has received statutory
change. The Tennessee Code4' provides that the statute of limi-
tations shall not apply to notes issued by a banking corporation
under the laws of Tennessee, whether the notes have ceased to
circulate as money or not, or whether the bank has or has not
ceased to exist as a corporation."
III. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND
CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT
Considerations such as the nature of the contract, the language
employed, ordinary business customs and usages, and the inten-
tions of the parties, have persuaded the majority of the American
courts to hold that the statute of limitations does not begin to run
against certificates of deposit until after an actual demand has
been made.43 In England there is no judicial authority on the
question for the reason that certificates of deposit are not used
there." Some American courts while professing to adhere to
the above rule hold that despite the fact that the statute does not
begin to run until a demand is made, the holder must make the
demand within a reasonable time-and this means within the
period of limitations. 45
In differentiating the rule with regard to promissory demand
notes from the majority rule as certificates of deposit, the Penn-
sylvania court has said,4 6 "The certificate of deposit is not a mere
,9 Cf. Dougherty v. Western Bank of Ga., supra note 36.
40 Butts v. Vicksburg & Meridian Ry. Co., supra note 38.
41 Tenn. Code, sec. 2779.
42 For other statutes which recognize the distinctive features of bank
notes and which excepts them from the general rule, see: Public Laws of
Vt. (1933) see. 1654; Rev. Stat. of Me. (1930) Chap. 95 sec. 1; Gen'l Laws
of Mass. (1932) Chap. 260 see. 1; N. Y. Code of Civil Procedure, Chap. 4,
see. 393.
48 Howell v. Adams (1877) 68 N. Y. 314; see also, Riddle v. First Na-
tional Bank of Butler (1886) 27 Fed. 503; Morse, Banks and Banking (3rd
ed.) see. 301.
4* Thus in the case of Richer v. Yoyer (1896) L. R. 5 P. C. 461, the court
quotes from Sir Montague Smith who declared that such instruments were
not in use in England.
45Accord: Pierce v. National State Bank of Boston (1913) 215 Mass. 18,
101 N. E. 1060. Contra: Gardner's Estate (1910) 228 Pa. 282, 77 Atl. 509.
46McGough v. Jamison (1884) 107 Pa. 336.
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due bill-it is not payable on demand merely, but is payable on
the return of the certificate. This superadded condition changes
its character, and the statute only begins to operate after a de-
mand and return of the certificate." The court was also of the
opinion that a certificate represents an amount of money de-
posited with the intention of securing a safe resting place for the
currency, and that consequently it could not be held that the bank
was under an immediate duty to pay. Another reason for the
rule was expressed in a South Dakota case4 7 in which the court
said, "Neither party contemplated the execution of a contract in-
ceptively bearing a stamp of dishonor, upon which a cause of
action accrued instantaneously without first calling on the banker
for payment, and the terms of the note bear no such construc-
tion." It has been said in a very enlightening Iowa case,4 "The
fundamental error in the cases which hold that the statute runs
from the date of the certificate is in holding that an ordinary
deposit of money is a loan thereof to the bank. On the contrary,
deposits in a bank are neither loans or bailments in the strict
sense of the terms. A deposit is a transaction peculiar to the
banking business, and one that the courts should recognize and
deal with according to commercial usage and understanding. The
primary purpose of a general deposit is to protect the fund, and
some of the incidental purposes thereof are the convenience of
checking and transacting large business transaction without
keeping and handling large sums of money. The transaction is
in reality for the benefit of the depositors, and while a relation
of debtor and creditor exists, and the bank has the use of the
money for commercial gain, it assumes no further obligation than
to pay the amount received when it shall be demanded at the
banking house. Hence a demand is necessary to mature the in-
strument, and the statute does not run until that time." 49
In a number of jurisdictions a deposit in the bank is considered
as a loan, and a certificate of deposit considered as having all
the earmarks of a promissory note payable on demand, and in
effect nothing but such. This doctrine has been fully explained
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Curran v. Witter 0 in which
the court said, "The cases which hold that such a certificate is
not due until presented for payment, and hence that the statute
does not run until that date, seem to go on the ground that the
transaction is not a loan of money, but rather that is is in the
nature of a bailment, upon which no cause of action accrues until
4 Tobin v. McKinney (1901) 15 S. D. 257, 88 N. W. 572.48 Elliot v. Capitol City State Bank (1905) 128 Ia. 275, 103 N. W. 777.
49 For further statements of the theory see: Fells Point Savings Institu-
tion v. Weedon (1862) 18 Md. 320; Smiley v. Fry (1885) 100 N. Y. 262,3 N. E. 186; Daniel, Negotiable Insbruments, Vol. 2 (5th ed.) sec. 1707a.5O (1887) 68 Wis. 16, 30 N. W. 706.
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demand; in other words it is said that the transaction is in con-
templation of law a deposit and not a loan. We cannot approve
such a doctrine. We think that when a person deposits money
in a bank in the usual course of business, he loans it to the bank,
and the bank thereby becomes his debtor to the amount of the
deposit-not his bailee of the money. By the deposit the title to
the money passes to the bank, and it is therefore its money, sub-ject to its absolute control and disposition. The depositor cannot
reclaim the specific money. He cannot maintain replevin or
trover (as he might were it a bailment) but only assumpsit for
the money deposited.151
Because of the conflict with respect to certificates of deposit
it is interesting to note the Negotiable Instruments Law on the
point. As previously mentioned, section 70 of the Law provides
that "presentment for payment is not necessary in order to
charge the person primarily liable on the instrument." Certifi-
cates of deposit receive no special mention and since the section
has been held to have adopted the majority rule with respect to
ordinary promissory demand notes52 many think that the section
changes the majority rule with regard to certificates of deposit
and bank notes.5 3 While one case, decided since the adoption of
the Negotiable Instruments Law, has held that an action could
be brought on a certificate of deposit without a previous de-
mand,5' yet section 70 was not cited nor relied upon. There seems
to be no cases at present which settles the problem.
IV. CRITICISMS AND CONCLUSIONS
The general rule that the statute of limitations begins to run
from the date of the note depends, as has been previously noted,
upon the rule that suit can be brought on the note without any
previous demand. This latter rule is justly open to the criticism
that it is an anomaly in the law that a breach of contract should
be made out by the very fact of suing. Indeed, this criticism can
be predicated to an even earlier point in the history of the de-
mand note, namely, that the general rule makes it necessary to
hold that there is a breach of contract the moment the note is
51 See also: Tripp v. Curtenius (1877) 36 Mich. 494; Mereness v. First
National Bank (1900) 112 Ia. 11; Mitchell v. Easton (1887) 37 Minn. 335,
33 N. W. 910.
52 Kelly v. Eggers (1929) 225 App. Div. 511, 233 N. Y. Supp. 638; Shu-
man v. Citizens State Bank of Rugby (1914) 27 N. D. 599, 147 N. W. 388.53 Ames, "This section changes the law in a number of states as to cer-
tificates of deposit and bank notes, and should be amended to except them."
McKeehan, "The statute would begin to run against certificates of deposit
from their date, which is contrary to the business custom and the language
of such instruments." Brannan, "This section (70) was intended to apply
to makers of notes and acceptors of bills, and its effect on certificates and
bank notes was evidently overlooked."
54 First National Bank v. Capps (1922) 208 Ala. 235, 94 So. 112.
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given. The fallacy in such a view is obvious because it cannot
be said, without violating the evident intentions of the parties,
that they intended to execute an instrument tainted at its incep-
tion with the mark of dishonor.
In adhering to the general rule the courts treat the word "de-
mand" as not being a part of the contract, but as being used only
to show that a debt is due. This theory is in clear conflict with
the rule usually applied by the courts that words are to be given
their plain and ordinary meaning. As the rule stands it makes
the provision that the instrument shall be payable on demand
mean just the opposite of what the language indicates. Consider
the situation when the ordinary business man, unversed in legal
technique, borrows a sum of money from another ordinary busi-
ness man, who as security therefor takes the former's note ex-
pressed to be "payable on demand." Is it not likely that the
parties never contemplated that the creditor could at once subject
the debtor to legal proceedings without giving the latter some
prior indication that the former desired immediate payment?
And is it not unreal to say that suit can be instituted upon the
note at once, especially when we consider that in the ordinary
course of human affairs, a man who is so distressed financially
as to have to secure a loan, is seldom able to make payment be-
fore the lapse of a definite period of time? Yet the law states
that despite the fact that the debtor was so low in funds that he
had to secure a loan, he must, nevertheless, be considered finan-
cially able to make payment immediately-that within the space
of an hour he must have changed from a man in sore need of
money to one with a sufficient surplus to meet his outstanding
obligations. The writer contends that this is a very unnatural
position to assume. It is more logical to say that the creditor by
allowing his security to be expressed as "payable on demand" un-
derstands that he is to allow the debtor sufficient time to rein-
force his financial position, and that he will not have to pay until
the creditor requests payment. This position is strengthened by
notes bearing interest. In such notes it is manifest that the
parties contemplated that the obligation evidenced by the note
should be continuing and outstanding; otherwise there is no pur-
pose to the interest provisions. It is not sound to say that effect
of the interest provision is to increase the principal debt ex die
in diem. It is more plausible to say that by inserting such a
provision in a note, the creditor was making an investment on
the sum of money he had loaned, and desired that the note should
remain outstanding so that the interest to be due him would
accumulate.
The corollary of the general rule, namely that the bringing of
the suit is sufficient demand, is fallacious and results in a logical
circle. By holding that a suit is sufficient demand the courts
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol20/iss4/11
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imply that a demand is necessary. But then the necessity of a
demand is negatived by sustaining a suit which is supposed to be
founded on a demand, when none in fact has been made. The
writ is in no sense the demand upon which the suit is founded.
The general rule contravenes the modern theory of the pur-
pose of the statute of limitations. It has been said that55 "at
present the view most prevalent is that the statute is one of re-
pose, the object of which is to suppress fraudulent and stale
claims from springing up at great distances of time, and sur-
prising the parties or their representatives, when all the proper
vouchers and evidence are lost, or the facts have become obscure
from the lapse of time or the defective memory, death or re-
moval of witnesses." If we apply this view of the statute it is
clear that the general rule should not be as it is. It is extremely
rare for the holder of a demand note to allow his claim to become
stagnant with the lapse of an unreasonable length of time. The
question of fraud seldom enters into the cases. The death or de-
fective memory of witnesses is a minor point since the face of the
instrument usually speaks for itself.
To maintain the general rule, moreover, one must also adhere
to the view that it is the duty of the maker of the note to seek
out the holder and tender payment, even though there has been
no demand for payment. In the first place, it is very doubtful
that the parties contemplated such a course. If they had they
would probably have omitted the words "on demand" from the
instrument. In the second place, it is not always possible for the
promisor to find the holder and tender payment. Frequently the
promisor does not know who the holder is since a note changes
hands. Moreover, distances separating the parties are great and
more often the holder has changed his location without the mak-
er's knowledge. Thus the rule applicable to non-negotiable paper
is out of place when applied to negotiable instruments.
Although most proponents of the general rule recognize the
"intention rule," they have failed to recognize its applicability in
most of the cases. That is to say, that although they profess not
to apply the general rule to cases where a contrary intent is ap-
parent, nevertheless, they do overlook the obvious design of the
parties in most of the cases to which they have applied the gen-
eral rule. Take for example, the case of Loewer's Gamrinus
Brewery Co. v. Preeker" in which the general rule was applied
although the court was cognizant of the fact that there was a
custom among brewers, and the parties in the case were brewers,
that when a demand note was made, there was an understanding
that the note was to be allowed to run while the party was in
55 17 R. C. L. 664.
156 Supra note 9.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
business. Again, consider the case of Sewell v. Swift 5l in which
the court ignored the fact that the notes were placed in the plain-
tiff's hands with the understanding that they were not to be re-
garded as promissory notes obligating the defendant to pay, but
were to be held by the plaintiff as evidence of an indebtedness
in the event of the defendant's death before the formation of a
certain company. The writer believes that the absurdity of apply-
ing the general rule to such cases is patent when the court ad-
mits that it would reach an opposite decision if a contrary intent
were shown.
In brief the author contends that by judicial decision or by
statute, the rule applicable to ordinary demand notes should be
changed so as to require an actual demand as a condition prece-
dent to the accrual of a cause of action; that being the case the
statute of limitations would not begin to run until the demand
had been made. In this way resort to the "intention rule," at
best always an uncertain and unreliable doctrine, would be rend-
ered unnecessary, and an uniformity, at present unknown in this
field, would be attained.
MALCOLM L. BARTLEY '35.
THE USE OF MANDAMUS IN MISSOURI
Mandamus is a writ of very ancient and obscure origin. It
seems originally to have been one of the many writs or mandates
by which the sovereign of England directed the performance of
any desired act by his subjects. These were not judicial writs,
merely commands. The command being a law in itself from
which there was no appeal, it was not merely declaratory of a
duty under existing law but created the law and imposed the
duty, the performance of which it commanded. It later assumed
a judicial nature, and as a judicial writ mandamus probably ap-
peared in use as early as the 14th and 15th centuries.1 It, how-
ever, did not come into systematic use until the latter part of the
17th century and was then a purely prerogative writ proceeding
from the king himself in the court of King's Bench. Its original
purpose was to prevent disorder from a failure of justice and
defect of police and grew out of the necessity of compelling in-
ferior courts to exercise judicial and ministerial powers invested
in them, by not only restraining their excesses but also prevent-
ing their negligence and restraining their denial of justice.2
The modern writ of mandamus may be defined as a command
57 Ibid.1 High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, (1884), sec. 2. (For convenience
this work will hereinafter be cited merely as "High.")2 Ferris, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, (1926), p. 219.
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